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Research shows that minority children enter the labor market with lower levels of 
acquired skill than their white counterparts. The causes of this skill gap, however, are not 
entirely understood. This paper analyzes one possible cause: the impact of a perceived 
lack of future opportunities on the human capital investment decisions of minority 
children and parents. Using NLSY79 data, I take advantage of changes in affirmative 
action laws regarding university admissions as a natural experiment. I test for changes in 
a variety of child and parental human capital investment variables such as time spent 
studying and parental involvement for children below the age of 15. The results show that 
time spent studying among 7
th and 8
th grade blacks in the affected states is significantly 
lower. The results for parental input variables show a fairly consistent negative trend 
among black parents of younger children. Additionally, cognitive achievement tests are 
examined and show significant results among the same age groups.  
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  11. Introduction  
  Research has shown that much of the differences in wages that exist between 
whites and minorities can be attributed to differences in skill level that exist prior to labor 
market entry (Neal and Johnson 1996). Additionally, it has been found that these skill 
gaps exist at very early ages, even before children enter primary school (Carneiro, 
Heckman, and Masterov (2005), Todd and Wolpin (2004), Fryer and Levitt (2004, 
2005)). What is not entirely known is why the skill gaps exist and, therefore, what role 
various policies may have in mitigating this issue. This paper examines one possible 
cause for the existence of these skill gaps. Namely that minorities perceive a world in 
which they expect to have fewer opportunities than whites and respond to this by 
investing less in human capital development when young. This concept has been 
suggested in the literature (Lundberg and Startz (1983), Lundberg and Startz (2000), Neal 
(2005), Carneiro, Heckman, and Masterov (2005), Todd and Wolpin (2007)), but, to my 
knowledge, has received very little attention empirically.  
  To test the hypothesis that minority parents and children respond to a perceived 
lack of future opportunities by investing less in human capital development I take 
advantage of the changes in affirmative action laws regarding university admissions that 
occurred during the mid 1990s. In a theoretical sense, the removal of affirmative action 
should have both an income and substitution effect on the human capital investment 
decisions of children. For underrepresented minorities, the removal of affirmative action 
makes it more difficult to be accepted into college with the same set of human capital 
investment. The child may either invest more to make up for this loss (income effect), or 
  2shift their time into other, non human capital activities, due to the perceived reduction in 
return to human capital development (substitution effect).  
  Using several direct measures of child and parental inputs into human capital 
development, such as hours spent studying, parental involvement in homework activities, 
and how often parents read to younger children, I find fairly consistent and significantly 
negative effects on human capital investment among black children and parents relative 
to whites and blacks from unaffected states. The results for investment variables are very 
closely mirrored by those for cognitive achievement outcomes. Overall, these results 
suggest that perceived limits on future opportunities may play a role in human capital 
investment among minority children and parents, and therefore may be a factor in the 
existence of the skill gap. 
2. Theoretical Framework  
  I propose a two-period labor-leisure choice model of the form: 
Max U = U(Y2,L1)                                                                                                             (1) 
  s . t .   H 1 = T1 – L1    (time  constraint) 
  s . t .     (budget constraint)  
1 0
21 0 [( ,) ]
H
YE f H S   Y 
   =  E[F(H1,S)] – E[F(0)] + Y
0 
 
where Y2 is the discounted sum of earnings for the child in the second period, Y
0 consists 
of factors affecting lifetime earnings unrelated to the stock of human capital, L1 is time 
spent in leisure activities during the first period, H1 is time spent on human capital 
investment during the first period, T1 is the total time available to split between leisure 
and human capital investment in the first period, S represents the decision to attend 
  3college by the child conditional on being admitted, and E[f(H1,S)] is the expected 
marginal rate of return to human capital investment.  
Second period income is a function of the human capital investment of the child 
when young and whether or not the child attends college. Here college operates as an 
intermediary step between periods 1 and 2. In period one, the child makes a decision 
between consuming leisure and investing in human capital. At the end of period one the 
child either attends or does not attend college and then earns Y2 in period two based on 
their decisions in period 1 and their ability to attend college. Whether or not the 
individual attends college is determined by the admission decisions of the college such 
that Prob (S = 1) = G(H1). The child will be accepted into college if a threshold (G*) is met 
given their level of human capital development and other factors affecting admission 
decisions. In this case we assume the presence of an affirmative action program in 
university admissions that, for a minority child, increases the probability that (G*) will be 
met for any given level of H1.   
If affirmative action is eliminated then it becomes less likely that a minority will 
be accepted into college for any given level of H1. It is fairly straightforward to derive a 
result where we have both an income and substitution effect in response to changes in the 
affirmative action laws and an ambiguous theoretical outcome.    
3. Affirmative Action and Higher Education 
The legal basis for the use of race based admissions criteria by universities prior 
to 1996 was primarily the result of the 1978 U.S. Supreme Court decision Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke.
2 The 1978 decision established the legality of using 
race as a factor in college admissions, stating that colleges and universities may use 
                                                 
2 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
  4admissions programs that take into account race in order to help foster diversity, however 
they could not use separate admissions procedures for minority candidates or quotas. This 
ruling set the stage for the inclusion of race in the decision making process for many 
academic admissions programs for the following twenty years.  
3.1. Challenges to Affirmative Action 
  On March 18, 1996 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5
th Circuit, covering 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, ruled on Hopwood v. Texas
3 involving a challenge to 
the University of Texas Law School admissions policies that included targeted 
percentages of Hispanic and black students. The court held that the affirmative action 
programs used were unconstitutional and that educational diversity should not be 
recognized as a compelling state interest.
4 In 1997 the Texas Attorney General 
announced that all universities in Texas should adopt a race-neutral admission criteria 
which was followed by a state law setting uniform admissions policies for all universities 
within Texas. This law forbade the explicit use of race in admissions policies but did 
include the automatic admission into public universities in Texas for all high school 
seniors graduating in the top ten percent of their graduating class. Similar follow-up steps 
were not undertaken in either Mississippi or Louisiana and it is unclear what impact, if 
any, the Hopwood decision had on minorities in those states.  
In November of 1996 voters in California passed Proposition 209
5, which banned 
all California affirmative action programs in public college admissions, government 
hiring, and government contracting, with 54 percent of the popular vote. According to 
                                                 
3 78 F.3d 932 (5
th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), as recognized in 
Bourdais v. New Orleans, 485 F.3d 294, 300 n.7 (5
th Cir. 2007) 
4 The Supreme Court refused to hear the case on appeal, so the impact of the ruling was restricted to the 5
th 
circuit. Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (mem.) 
5 CAL. Const. art. I,§ 31. 
  5exit polling data, voting for Proposition 209 largely followed racial lines with 
approximately 59.2% of white voters, 37.4% of Hispanic voters, and only 18.2% of black 
voters voting in support.
6 The proposition ultimately took effect on November 3
rd 1997 
after being delayed in the courts for almost a year. Although the proposition was not 
passed until late 1996 and did not take effect until the following year, it was well 
publicized and debated throughout much of 1996.  
Figures 1 to 3 show some of the descriptive impact of the banning of affirmative 
action on the University of California system of schools. Figure 1 shows admit rates as a 
percent of total applications by race for the University of California system from 1994 to 
2004. In 1998, the first entering class following the enactment of the ban shows a strong 
drop in admit rates for black students. Figure 2 shows application and admit rates for 
blacks into the UC system as a percent of the total 18 year old black population in 
California for years 1994 to 1999. Admit rates as a percent of the total 18 year old black 
population in California dropped slightly in 1997, the year prior to the policy becoming 
binding, and dropped further in subsequent years. The initial drop, however, may be 
explained by the drop in application rates in 1997. This is relevant, because in 1997 the 
law had passed, but was not binding yet and suggests that blacks may have been altering 
their behavior prior to the law being enacted. Figure 3 shows the change in admit rates 
among blacks as a percent of total applications for the two most selective schools in the 
UC system, Berkeley and UCLA. 
  There have been other state level prohibitions or challenges on the use of 
affirmative action policies for university admissions over the past decade. Washington 
                                                 
6 Alvarez and Bedolla (2004), taken from Voter News Service exit polling data. 
  6State passed Initiative 200 in November of 1998, Florida passed a law that banned race 
and gender preferences in college admissions in 2001, and Michigan has had a pair of 
cases, Gratz v. Bollinger
7 and Grutter v. Bollinger
8, brought before the courts regarding 
the use of race in admissions policies. The latter case was ultimately appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court where, on June 23, 2003, the court upheld the University of Michigan’s 
Law School admission policy and effectively overturned the Hopwood v. Texas decision.  
3.2. Literature on Affirmative Action Bans 
  There does exist a growing literature within economics that examines the impact 
of these policy changes on the behavior of minorities (Long 2004a, 2004b, 2007; Card 
and Krueger 2005; Brown and Hirschman 2006; Dickson 2006).
9 These studies have 
primarily focused on the decisions of high school children as they prepare to enter college 
and therefore are looking at responses to policies that alter the immediate constraints 
facing the children. However, they do suggest that the policy changes are relevant enough 
to alter the behavior of older children and therefore it is certainly plausible that younger 
children or the parents of younger children might respond to such a change in the 
landscape of opportunities facing minorities. 
4. Data  
  I use the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) and the 
Children of the NLSY79 (CNLSY79). The NLSY79 began as a nationally representative 
sample of 12,686 men and women who were fourteen to twenty-one years old in 1979, 
                                                 
7 539 U.S. 244 (2003) 
8 539 U.S. 306 (2003) 
9 Long (2004) finds that the minority-white gap in SAT reports sent to colleges widened following the end 
of affirmative action in California and Texas. Brown and Hirschman (2006) find that application rates 
among minorities in Washington State declined following the enactment of I-200. Dickson (2006) finds 
that the percent of blacks and Hispanics applying to college in Texas immediately after the end of 
affirmative action dropped significantly.  
  7and the CNLSY79 consists of all children born to women from the original NLSY79 
cohort. Interviews for the CNLSY79 have been conducted biannually since the survey 
was initiated in 1986. Access was granted to the restricted use version of the data that 
allowed me to put a state-identifier with each individual in the survey. 
Although the original NLSY79 was a nationally representative sample, the 
CNLSY79 is not. The CNLSY79 is heavily weighted with first born children and 
children of young mothers.
10 In order to account for this, sample weights included in the 
data are used throughout this study to adjust estimates to be nationally representative. 
Additionally, since the sample includes children born to the original NLSY79 cohort, 
children of recent immigrants are not included in the data. As a result, Hispanics in the 
sample are unlikely to correspond closely to the current Hispanic population in the U.S.  
Empirical results, therefore, will primarily focus on the behavior of blacks relative to 
whites. Hispanics are kept in the sample as an additional comparison group.
11 
Only children known to be residing with their mother at the time of the survey 
were included in the analysis. This was necessary to ensure that the mother’s background 
information was relevant for the child included in the sample. Additionally, I omitted 
children who were residing outside of the U.S. at the time of the survey.  
The CNLSY79 data contain a number of behavioral variables for both the child 
and mother that may have a direct impact on the level of human capital development. The 
key dependent variables used in the study are briefly outlined below.  
4.1. Weekly Hours Spent on Homework by the Child 
                                                 
10 45.2% of the total observation years in the sample are from first-born children, and the mean age at birth 
for the mothers in the sample is approximately 24 years. 
11 The inclusion of Hispanics is potentially useful as a control for unobservable schooling impacts since 
blacks and Hispanics tend to belong to similar schools. 
  8  I use four direct measures of hours spent doing homework each week from the 
CNLSY. Beginning in 1996, each child was asked how many hours are spent on 
homework in school and how many hours are spent on homework after school each 
week. Additionally, the mother was asked to estimate the number of hours spent by the 
child each week on math homework and on writing homework respectively.
12 The 
redundancy of these questions asked of both the parent and child independently provides 
a means to test the reliability of the results.   
4.2. Parental Involvement Variables 
  There are a number of questions within the data that document the mother’s 
involvement with the child. Given that I am concerned with parental activities related to 
the human capital development of the child, I constrain my analysis to variables directly 
related to involvement with study activities and schooling. Among the variables 
examined are child self reports concerning how often parents help with homework and 
how often parents check on homework. Each of these questions have been asked since 
1996. In each case the child was given six choices as possible responses, ranging from 
never to everyday.  
  In addition to the child self report variables I also look at the question asked of the 
mother on how often the mother reads to the child. This question has been included in the 
CNLSY survey since its inception in 1986, so a nice baseline is provided with regard to 
parental behavior prior to the changes in policy. Unlike other responses used in the study, 
this question is only asked of mothers up to the child age of nine and is asked separately 
                                                 
12 The 1996 and 1998 version of the survey round parental responses to the nearest hour, however the 2000 
and 2002 versions allow for a more continuous measure by adding two additional zeros on the end of each 
response. (i.e. 3 hours is coded as 300). These data were divided by 100 to more closely match responses 
from earlier waves of the survey. As a result, responses in the latter years include fractional hours while 
earlier responses do not.  
  9for mothers of children aged zero to two, three to five, and six to nine. I include this 
question to observe possible changes in parental behavior toward younger children. This 
variable has been used frequently in the literature and serves as a proxy for overall 
involvement by the parents in the human capital development of younger children.  
4.3. Cognitive Assessment 
The cognitive assessment measure used in the analysis is the Peabody Individual 
Achievement Test (PIAT) for Mathematics. This assessment test was administered to all 
children in the sample between the ages of five and fourteen during each wave of the 
survey. The advantage of using this test as a measure of cognitive ability is that it has 
been administered repeatedly to children over the age of five, providing a development 
profile for each child in the sample.  
The PIAT math test consists of 84 multiple-choice questions of increasing 
difficulty, beginning with elementary arithmetic and progressing to advanced concepts in 
geometry and trigonometry. Raw scores were used as opposed to percentile or age 
adjusted standardized scores in order to provide an absolute measure of ability that allows 
for the measurement of gains over time as children age.
13 This particular measure of child 
ability is well suited for the measurement of changes in achievement as children age since 
the same test is given to children in all age groups. Additionally, the PIAT math 
assessment has the advantage of having a high completion rate within the CNLSY79 
dataset.
14 The high completion rate within the sample coupled with the fact that all 
                                                 
13 The primary results are not sensitive to this choice. 
14 The 2000 survey had a valid completion rate of 93.4% for black children, 92.5% for Hispanics, and 
90.8% for whites. Source: NLSY79 Child & Young Adult Data Users Guide, Table 2.14. 
  10children in the sample are given the test helps to mitigate the issue of selection bias that 
would exist with using SAT scores or other similar measures. 
4.4. Covariates 
  The use of NLSY data allows for a fairly rich set of family and individual 
background variables. The regressions control for the mother’s highest grade completed, 
birth order of the child, child’s gender, age of the child, grade, whether or not the child 
lived in an urban area, and the presence of a spouse or partner within the household.
15 
Summary statistics for covariates are provided in table 1. 
5. Empirical Analysis and Results 
The estimating strategy is as follows. First, I attempt to establish a link between 
the period in which the affirmative action policies occurred and changes in educational 
expectations for younger minority children in those states. Second, I examine possible 
impacts on human capital investment variables. Finally, I analyze if there are impacts on 
cognitive achievement for groups that closely match those for whom changes in human 
capital investments were observed.  
In all phases of the analysis four states were excluded due to concerns about the 
status of affirmative action laws with regards to university admissions in those states. 
Mississippi and Louisiana were excluded as they are part of the 5
th circuit and thus were 
also covered under the Hopwood decision, however Hopwood was followed by official 
changes in policy in Texas which did not occur in either Mississippi or Louisiana. As 
such, it is unclear what, if any, impact the Hopwood decision would have had in these 
                                                 
15 Analyses were also performed using net family income, family size, and mother’s employment status to 
account for differences in these variables and as a control on the possible impact of components of 
California’s Proposition 209 that extended beyond university admissions. Inclusion of these variables 
required a reduction in sample sizes and primary results remained relatively similar, so reported results are 
restricted to the more general set of variables.  
  11states. Washington was omitted due to a significant lack of observations regarding 
minorities within the CNLSY data.  The Florida case is more problematic due to the 
elimination of affirmative occurring much later and following significant debate lasting 
several years. The length of the debate in Florida prior to the actual banning of 
affirmative action, and that it had to be taken as a credible threat, given what had already 
occurred in California and Texas, creates some ambiguity in determining exactly when 
minorities in Florida may have been legitimately responding to these threats. As a result I 
have focused on California and Texas, however the inclusion of these four omitted states 
will be examined as part of the sensitivity analysis. 
5.1. Expectations 
  Given the many possible alternative explanations for minorities investing less in 
human capital development I begin the empirical analysis by examining child responses 
to survey questions within the data regarding their expected educational attainment 
during their lifetime. The question provides for a number of possible responses ranging 
from high school dropout to post-graduate education. These responses were collapsed 
into two categories: some college and beyond or high school degree or less.  Responses 
were available from 1988 to 2002, so difference-in-difference-in-differences 
methodology was employed to determine if there was a significant drop in expectations 
about attending college for blacks in the affected states following the policy changes 
relative to whites and children of all races and ethnicities from unaffected states. 
Estimation was performed using a probit model: 
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where  black is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual is black and zero 
otherwise, Hispanic is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual is of non-black, 
Hispanic ethnicity, Caltex is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual lived in 
either California or Texas, Policy is defined as observations occurring in 1996 or beyond, 
and vit is the error term.
16 Xit is a vector of individual and family characteristics that 
includes a dummy variable for female, birth order of the child, age of the child in months 
and age-squared, highest grade achieved by the mother, a dummy variable for urban 
equal to one if the child’s residence is classified as an urban area within the NLSY data, 
the grade of the child and grade-squared, and the marital status of the mother. To account 
for year-to-year shocks a vector of year dummy variables were also included with the 
initial year omitted to serve as the base year.  
Marginal effects are presented in table 2. Column one shows results for the full 
sample of children in grades three to eight. Columns two and three show results from the 
full sample but omitting one of the policy states. This was done to check if results are 
robust to each state individually. Columns four to six show results by grade group. 
Overall, the results show a highly significant, negative impact on expectations for black 
children in grades five to eight that are robust to both states individually. No significant 
results are found for third and fourth graders.  
5.2. Parental Involvement 
                                                 
16 As per Bertrand et al. (2002), robust standard errors were calculated clustered around individual states. 
This is followed throughout all analyses in this study. 
  13  The responses to how often the parents check homework, how often the parents 
help with homework, and how often the mother reads to the child allow for a variety of 
possible responses regarding parental behavior. To take advantage of this, an ordered 
probit model is used to estimate the possible effects of the policy changes on these 
activities.  
Prob(Involvementit=j) = prob(vj-1<Iit<vj)                                                                                      (4) 
where j corresponds to the possible choice of responses, Iit is defined as 
it it t i it
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for how often the parent checks on or helps with homework and 
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for how often the mother reads to the child, and vj are the cut points for the corresponding 
value of j.
17 In each case there is a natural, hierarchical ordering to the responses given, 
although the distances between each value do not imply a cardinal ranking. As such the 
actual value of response is not relevant, only that higher valued responses correspond to 
greater levels of involvement among the parents.     
  The ordered-probit regression results are shown in Table 3. There are some 
interesting trends evident in the data for the frequency with which black parents check on 
or help with the homework of their child. Black parents of 3
rd to 6
th graders in California 
                                                 
17 For how often the parents check homework and how often parents help with homework, j=(0=never, 
1=less than once month, 2=1-2 times a month, 3=1-2 times a week, 4=almost every day, 5=every day). For 
how often the parent reads to the child, j=(1=never, 2=several times a year, 3=several times a month, 
4=once a week, 5=about 3 times a week, 6=everyday). 
  14and Texas show strongly significant, negative results that are robust to both states. The 
youngest age group essentially shows no impact.   
  The results for how often black parents in California and Texas read to their child 
after the policy changes show a strongly negative result for two of the three age groups 
examined, both highly significant and robust to both states individually. These results are 
intriguing for two reasons. First, they include several years of observation both before 
and after the policy changes. Second, much of the current literature focuses on the impact 
of reading to children in the early years of childhood on the existing black-white skill 
gaps, thus finding significant results among this set of decision variables does provide a 
more direct link between perceptions about future opportunities and the important early 
skill gaps that exist between races. 
5.3. Weekly Hours Spent on Homework  
  Estimation on weekly hours spent doing homework using pooled, independent 
cross sections were done using the difference-in-differences estimator where the 
treatment groups are minority children (black and Hispanic) in California and Texas and 
the control group consisted of white children in California and Texas and children of all 
races and ethnicities in the rest of the U.S. The data were divided into two-year grade 
groups. This was done to account for the fact that time spent doing homework may vary 
considerable across grade levels.  
  Separate analyses were performed for each of the four measures: weekly hours 
spent doing homework at school, weekly hours spent doing homework outside of school, 
weekly hours spent doing math homework, and weekly hours spent doing writing 
homework.   
  15  The underlying regression equation for weekly hours spent doing homework is: 
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where Hoursit is the number of hours spent each week on homework for each of the four 
measures previously mentioned for individual i in year t. Observations were omitted if 
the relevant measure of hours spent studying was missing in the data or if data was 
missing from one of the covariates used in each of the analyses.  
  When pooling two policy states together as a single treatment group there is 
always the possibility that a state specific effect could be driving the overall results. 
Results, therefore, are also reported using California and Texas independently relative to 
the rest of the country. There is also the issue of a lower bound on the number of hours 
spent studying each week. Approximately thirty percent of the sample reported zero 
hours each week. Using a linear model in this case may lead to negative predictions for 
hours studying, so the Tobit model is used for the estimation.  
  The results for hours spent doing homework are presented in tables 4 and 5. Table 
4 panel A provides results for the outcomes of interest, the difference-in-differences 
estimators Caltex*Black and Caltex*Hispanic, for 7
th and 8
th graders. Column one shows 
results for the entire sample for all years 1996 to 2002. The results show that blacks in 
California and Texas study significantly less on all three measures of hours spent doing 
homework after school.   
Columns two and three show results for California and Texas separately relative 
to the rest of the U.S. The California results are almost identical to those from the entire 
sample, while the Texas results show a slightly smaller effect and are insignificant for 
one of the three measures. Overall, these results suggest a negative effect on hours spent 
  16studying after school among 7
th and 8
th grade black children that is consistent across all 
measures, and appears to not be a state specific event.  
  In order to get a better sense of who is most affected by the policy changes I 
divide the sample into two groups based on mother’s education with those with mothers 
having at least some college (13 years or greater) into one group and those with mothers 
having a high school degree or less in the other. The intuition being that children with 
mothers having more than a high school education may live in a household that is more 
informed about the policy changes and may be more likely to be considering college 
themselves. These results are shown in columns four and five of Table 4 and strongly 
support the above hypothesis with an even larger impact on black children of higher 
educated mothers, while the effect on children of lesser educated mothers are 
insignificant on two of the three after school measures.  
The results for time spent studying at school show no significant impacts among 
the relevant variables for black children. A possible explanation being that time spent at 
school is more a product of the schools attended and less the result of choices made by 
the students themselves. This variable is included as a possible proxy for school effects. 
In order to test whether the results on hours spent doing homework after school 
are simply the result of differences in the frequency of homework assigned by the 
teacher, I utilize child responses regarding how often their teacher assigns homework 
each week. I divide the data into two groups: those whose teacher assigns homework 
several times a week and those whose teacher assigns homework two or fewer times per 
week. Results, reported in panel B of table 4, are very strong for black children assigned 
homework several times per week and are robust across all three after school measures 
  17and both states. Results for the children with less frequent homework are generally 
negative, with more intermittent significant results. These results tend to support the 
argument that differences in the amount of homework assigned do not explain the 
disparities in hours spent studying among minorities in the affected states.  
  Table 5 shows the primary results for hours spent studying after school for all 
grade groups. The results show a consistently negative outcome among blacks, with 
eleven of the twelve measures for hours spent after school having negative coefficients, 
however, only six of the twelve are significant. The strongest results are among the oldest 
group tested which is consistent with the policy change used in the analysis given that it 
is the older children who are most likely to understand the policy and its possible 
implications. The significant results among the youngest group could perhaps be 
explained by the significant reductions in parental involvement prior to the child starting 
school, shown in table 3 panel C.  
6. Impact on Cognitive Achievement 
  I use two methods to test the impact on cognitive achievement. First, I organize 
the data into independent cross-sections broken down by age group to compare test 
scores for groups of children of similar ages before and after the policy changes. Second, 
I arrange the data as a panel and analyze using an individual fixed effects model to look 
at changes in the growth rate of test scores for the same children as they age. In the 
analysis of test scores post-policy refers to the years 1998, 2000, and 2002, while pre-
policy refers to all years prior. This is due to the obvious lag that should occur between 
changes in investment decisions and the impact on test scores.   
6.1. Independent Cross-Sections by Age Group 
  18  Estimation for the cross-sectional analysis was done using the following equation:  
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where Mathit is the math score for individual i in year t, Policyt is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the observation occurs in the post policy era (1998, 2000, or 2002), and Xit 
includes all variables previously defined with the addition of a control for the number of 
times the child has taken the test in previous years.  
The empirical results from the estimation using the entire U.S. sample are 
presented in Table 6. Column one gives estimates for all age groups pooled together. 
Columns two to five show results for the two year age groupings.  
The signs for all standard explanatory variables are consistent with a priori 
expectations. The coefficients of primary interest are presented in rows one and two. The 
coefficient on Policy*CT*Black is negative and significant at the 1% level for the all age 
group and two of the four two-year age groupings. The coefficients are also economically 
significant considering that the test has a score range of 0 to 84 points. For perspective, 
the mean test score for U.S. blacks in the post-policy era is 43.2, so a coefficient of -
2.327 represents a reduction in test scores of approximately 5.3% relative to blacks 
elsewhere. The coefficient for the thirteen and fourteen year old group of -6.379 implies 
an adjusted score that is approximately 12% lower than blacks elsewhere. Estimates for 
the effect on Hispanic children are insignificant for all specifications of the model tested. 
The  Policy*Caltex variable captures the impact of the policy changes on whites in 
California and Texas. The coefficient is positive and significant for both the pooled group 
  19and the oldest age group. It appears, based on this, that possible concern over California 
and Texas whites being an adequate control group may be warranted since it violates the 
primary assumption that the control group be unaffected by the policy change. This adds 
to the importance of including whites and minorities elsewhere as an additional control 
group to help mitigate the effects of this problem. Additionally, the finding that whites in 
California and Texas were doing significantly better following the policy changes adds 
empirical support to the proposed theoretical foundation given that whites presumably 
perceived an increase in educational opportunities. 
Figures 4 and 5 show math test score kernel density estimates derived from the 
regression residuals for thirteen and fourteen year olds. Figure 4 shows the density 
distribution for California and Texas blacks before and after the policy changes, 
illustrating a pretty clear shift to the left in the distribution for the post policy period. For 
comparison purposes, Figure 4 also shows the test score distribution for blacks living in 
unaffected states before and after the policy changes. There does appear to be slight gains 
for blacks elsewhere, but the groups much more closely resemble each other than what 
was found in the policy states. Figure 5 compares kernel density estimates for California 
and Texas blacks and whites before and after the policy changes. The figure shows that 
white children were performing better than blacks prior to the policy changes, however 
after the policy changes the gulf widened noticeably. 
6.1.1. Robustness  
In addition to the primary model I also examine a number of alternative 
specifications.  The results, broken down by model specification and age group, are 
shown in table 7 with results from the primary model described in the previous section 
  20reproduced in row one for comparison purposes. Overall, the results for blacks are very 
consistent across all specifications and closely match those found among the investment 
variables discussed earlier in terms of age groups. 
Rows two through ten include the same set of covariates as the main regressions 
presented in table 6 but alter the sample used. Row two looks at a model restricted to 
California and Texas only and omits the rest of the country as a comparison group. This 
specification is included to avoid possible unknown factors from other states that may be 
contributing to the significant results found in the main model.  
Rows three and four show results for a model where each of the policy states are 
tested independently, omitting the other state from the sample. These specifications are 
included to address the possibility that events within a single state, either California or 
Texas, may be driving the overall results. It appears, based on these results, that the 
results from the main set of regressions reported in table 6 are not being driven by a 
single, state specific event since results are fairly similar for both models that exclude one 
of the policy states. The robustness of the results to the Texas only specification is also 
important because it suggests that results are not being entirely driven by the more 
expansive policy change that occurred in California. 
Row five looks at a model that is restricted to blacks before and after the policy in 
the affected states relative to blacks elsewhere. This sample specification suggests that 
the inclusion of California and Texas whites are not driving the results and that blacks in 
California and Texas had a reduction in their human capital development relative to 
blacks elsewhere.  
  21Row six shows results for a model that omits the year 1996 from the sample. The 
policies in question were passed in 1996 but not enacted until 1997. Given that the 
outcome measure of interest is a math test score, it is expected that there should be a lag 
between possible changes in minority behavior and the subsequent impact on test scores. 
As a result, 1998 was selected as the initial post-policy year. There is, however, some 
ambiguity as to whether 1996 should be classified as pre-policy. The results show very 
little change for a sample with 1996 omitted. 
Rows seven to ten show results that include states omitted for various reasons 
from the main model tested. The remaining rows add additional covariates to the basic set 
used in the main model, such as mother’s AFQT, net family income, marital status of the 
mother, and family size.  Adding in additional covariates ultimately reduces sample sizes 
due to missing observations, so the more basic set of covariates is used in the primary 
analyses. The results, however, show that very little changes once the additional 
covariates are added to the model.  
The sample was also divided into two groups, those with mothers who had 
thirteen or more years of education and those having twelve or fewer years. These results 
are shown in Table 8. The results show a large and significant negative impact of the 
policy on California and Texas blacks in the high mother’s education group for three of 
the five age groupings and negative coefficients on all of them. The low mother’s 
education group has a much smaller effect and is significant for only the eldest group. 
This again matches closely to the results found in table 4, with strongest results occurring 
among children whose mother had at least some college and among the eldest age group.  
6.2. Impact on the Growth Rate of Test Scores 
  22  In order to examine the rate of growth in math scores as children age I organize 
the data as a panel of same individuals across time and estimate using an individual fixed 
effects model. I estimate the model using three sets of panel data: a sample that includes 
all races but is restricted to California and Texas only, a sample that includes all races for 
the entire U.S., and a U.S. sample that is restricted to only blacks. In all cases I restrict 
the samples to individuals who had valid math test scores in both 1996 and 2000.   
  The estimating equation for the model that includes the entire U.S. is: 
it i it i i t
i i t i t
i t i t t it
u a X Hispanic Caltex Policy
Black Caltex Policy Caltex Policy
Hispanic Policy Black Policy Policy C Math
   
 
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where Xit is a vector of observable time varying individual characteristics, ai includes the 
unobservable individual characteristics that are constant over time.   
  Results for the individual fixed effects estimation are presented in Table 9. 
Column two reports results for the sample that includes the entire U.S. Results for the 
model with data restricted to California and Texas only are shown in column three. 
Column four shows results from a U.S. sample restricted to only blacks.   
The coefficient for the effect of the policy on blacks in California and Texas from 
the U.S. model, Policy*CalTex*Black from column one, is -7.092 and significant at the 
1% level. The other sample specifications also show highly significant results for blacks 
in California and Texas (Policy*Black from column two and Policy*CalTex from column 
three). Column 1 of table 9 shows the growth rate for a panel beginning in 1990 and 
ending in 1994, prior to the policy changes. No significant differences among blacks in 
California and Texas are found, suggesting no pre-trend existed. Figure 6 shows the rate 
  23of growth in math test scores taken from the regression residuals for various groups. The 
distribution for California and Texas blacks is clearly to the left of all others.    
7. Conclusion and Discussion  
Recent literature has demonstrated the importance of white-minority skill gaps in 
explaining wage differentials between races. It has also been shown that these skill gaps 
are present at very early ages and persist through adulthood. Given the significant role 
that skill gaps have in explaining wage inequality it is important to better understand the 
causes of these gaps in order to help make informed policy decisions that can be effective 
at remedying this issue. In this paper I have attempted to empirically analyze one 
potential cause for the existence of skill gaps. Namely that minorities perceive a world in 
which they expect to have fewer opportunities than whites and respond to this by 
investing less in human capital development when young.      
Using changes in the affirmative action policies regarding admissions into 
colleges and universities that occurred in California and Texas during the mid 1990s, I 
examine a number of child and parental human capital investment variables to see if the 
policy changes resulted in changes in minority behavior. I find fairly consistent, negative 
results among child input variables for black children and parents in the affected states. 
I also find a highly significant, negative impact on math test scores for black 
children that is consistent across sample and model specifications. The results are 
strongest among older children and children whose mother had more than twelve years of 
education. More importantly, these results closely match those found for investment 
variables. Older children were found to have spent significantly less time studying, which 
corresponds closely to drops in test scores for children in this age group using a much 
  24longer period of data. The significant drop in test scores found among younger children 
also corresponds closely to changes in parental inputs among this age group. Hispanic 
children show more ambiguous results.  
The stronger results for black children than for Hispanic children are consistent 
with three important factors. First, public attention regarding economic and social 
disadvantage in the United States appears to be significantly more focused on the plight 
of blacks than any other minority group. As a result, it is plausible that perceptions about 
fewer opportunities of all types for blacks is more ingrained in our society than it is for 
other minority groups. Second, exit polling data from the 1996 election regarding 
Proposition 209 in California suggested that Hispanics were much more divided on the 
issue than were blacks. Finally, the black-white skill gap is marginally larger than the 
Hispanic-white gap. The results are consistent with negative expectations possibly 
affecting both groups, but affecting blacks in a more significant fashion. 
It is possible that the effects found could be the result of concurrent policy 
changes or events unrelated to the ending of affirmative action. It is important to note, 
however, that any policy that affects children of all races equally would be controlled for 
in both the difference-in-differences or fixed effects estimations. What would be required 
are policies that differentially affect minorities. Further, given that stronger results are 
found for black children than for Hispanic children, any concurrent policy changes would 
have to differentially affect black children in a negative fashion in order to produce these 
results. Certainly a case could be made that school funding changes may differentially 
affect inner-city schools and therefore have a greater impact, positive or negative, on 
  25minority children. In many cases, however, blacks and Hispanics go to the same schools 
and should be affected equally by such an outcome. 
 Overall, the results do suggest that negative future expectations are playing a role 
in the human capital development of black children. Additionally, the results suggest that 
affirmative action programs may play a role in skill levels between whites and blacks 
beyond the intended goals of such policies. At the very least, it appears that ending 
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  28Table 1: Summary Statistics – Mean (Standard Deviation) 
  CA & Tex   
Blacks 
U.S.         
Blacks 
CA & Tex   
Hispanics 
U.S.         
Hispanics 
CA & Tex   
Whites 
U.S.         
Whites 
           
Observations  798 4859 2081  1534 1055  7090 
           












           












           





























           












           
% Female  49.7%  51.7%  48.8% 46.1%  49.7%  49.7% 
           
% Two Parent 
Household 
40.8%  34.8% 66.8%  54.4% 74.7%  77.1% 
           
%  Urban  95.1%  79.1% 90.7%  88.1% 76.7%  61.9% 



































  29Table 2: Probit Marginal Effects – Child Expects to Attend College    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All  Cal  Tex  3 & 4  5 & 6  7 & 8 














































































































































         

























         












         

























         
Observations  8752 7953 7647 1639  4088 3025 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.         









  30Table 3: Parental Inputs - Ordered Probits    
Panel A: How Often Parents Check Homework 
    
  CalTex*Black  CalTex*Hispanic 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
 (All)  (Cal)  (Tex)  (All)  (Cal)  (Tex) 
         












         












         












         
Panel B: How Often Parents Help with Homework 
    
  CalTex*Black  CalTex*Hispanic 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
 (All)  (Cal)  (Tex)  (All)  (Cal)  (Tex) 
         












         












         












         
Panel C: How often Mother Reads to Child 
    
  Policy*CalTex*Black  Policy*CalTex*Hispanic 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
 (All)  (Cal)  (Tex)  (All)  (Cal)  (Tex) 
         












         












         












         
Robust standard errors in parentheses.         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Regression covariates also included mother’s high grade, gender, birth order, marital status of mother, urban, grade, 













  31Table 4: Tobit Grades 7 & 8 - Weekly Hours Spent on Homework       
Panel A: Full Sample  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 (All)  (Cal)  (Tex)  (High)  (Low) 
CalTex*Black          












       












       
Hours After School Homework   











       
Hours In School Homework   











       
CalTex*Hispanic          












       












       
Hours After School Homework   











       
Hours In School Homework   











       
Panel B: California and Texas Blacks by Frequency of Homework Given by Teacher 
 (All)  (Cal)  (Tex)  (High)  (Low) 
A l m o s t   E v e r y   D a y         












       












       
Hours After School Homework   











       
Hours In School Homework   











       
Less Than Twice a Week           












       












       
Hours After School Homework   











       
Hours In School Homework   











       
Robust  Standard  errors  in  parentheses.        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.     
Regression covariates also included mother’s high grade, gender, birth order, marital status of mother, urban, grade, 
age, and year. 
 
  32Table 5: Tobit by Grade Group - Weekly Hours Spent on Homework      
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  1 & 2  3 & 4  5 & 6  7 & 8 
CalTex*Black        








        








        








        
Hours In School Homework  









        
CalTex*Hispanic        








        








        








        
Hours In School Homework  









        
        
Robust  Standard  errors  in  parentheses.        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
Regression covariates also included mother’s high grade, gender, birth order, marital status of mother, urban, grade, 
age, and year. 
 


























  33Table 6: PIAT Math Raw Score - Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences Estimation U.S. Model – By Age Group 
  All  7 & 8  9 & 10  11 & 12  13 & 14 
Policy*CT*Black -2.327***  -3.463*** 0.487  -0.734  -6.379*** 
  (0.543) (1.017) (0.658) (0.891) (0.897) 
Policy*CT*Hisp.  -0.678 1.083  -1.015 0.698  -2.013 
  (0.918) (1.298) (1.387) (1.349) (1.823) 
Black  -5.573*** -5.704*** -5.093*** -5.270*** -6.270*** 
  (0.396) (0.388) (0.462) (0.568) (0.657) 
Hispanic  -3.360*** -3.835*** -3.700*** -2.967*** -1.920 
  (0.474) (0.529) (0.520) (0.825) (1.223) 
CalTex  (CT)  -0.123  0.231 0.117 0.259 -1.156 
  (0.552) (0.271) (0.662) (0.765) (1.060) 
Policy*Black  -0.426 0.747  -0.818 -1.437 0.483 
  (0.378) (0.560) (0.557) (0.918) (0.719) 
Policy*Hispanic  -0.951 -0.905 -0.999 -2.179 -0.486 
  (0.915) (0.906) (1.144) (1.369) (1.690) 
CalTex*Black 0.499 -0.095  0.272 0.270 1.212 
  (0.458) (0.535) (0.463) (0.552) (1.127) 
CalTex*Hispanic -0.691  -0.541 0.476  -1.908**  -2.042 
  (0.540) (0.488) (0.519) (0.868) (1.394) 
Policy*CalTex 1.040**  0.821 0.034 0.456 3.276*** 
  (0.442) (0.664) (0.520) (0.945) (0.689) 
Times Taken  0.364**  0.823* 0.979***  0.267  0.695*** 
  (0.143) (0.413) (0.248) (0.257) (0.245) 
Female -1.202***  -0.391  -1.479*** -1.651*** -1.491*** 
  (0.302) (0.345) (0.374) (0.371) (0.478) 
Grade  4.026*** 4.662*** 13.629***  8.790*** 11.475*** 
  (0.331) (1.030) (1.344) (2.369) (2.598) 
Grade
2  -0.036 -0.407 -1.214***  -0.441**  -0.531*** 
  (0.034) (0.251) (0.163) (0.195) (0.177) 
Child’s Age (Months)  1.012***  0.443  0.032  -0.598  -4.545*** 
  (0.059) (0.564) (0.593) (1.069) (1.678) 
Child’s Age
2  -0.004***  -0.000 -0.000 0.002  0.013** 
  (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
Mother’s  High  Grade  0.995*** 0.997*** 0.942*** 0.955*** 1.079*** 
  (0.079) (0.086) (0.087) (0.111) (0.101) 
Urban  0.378 0.625*  0.470 0.505 -0.442 
  (0.276) (0.329) (0.321) (0.394) (0.626) 
Birth Order  -0.599***  -0.429** -0.475*  -0.670***  -0.879*** 
  (0.173) (0.196) (0.236) (0.204) (0.197) 
Constant -48.264***  -28.003  -3.100  54.727  378.233*** 
  (3.411)  (26.706) (34.011) (72.761) (135.741) 
Observations  17417  5036 4950 4443 2988 
R-squared  0.59 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.23 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.Year dummy variables suppressed.       













  34Table 7: PIAT Math – Policy Impact on Blacks by Model Specification and Age Group 
Model  All  7 & 8  9 & 10  11 & 12  13 & 14 
Primary -2.327***  -3.463***  0.487  -0.734  -6.378*** 
  (0.543) (1.017) (0.658) (0.891) (0.897) 
      
CA & TX  -2.545*  -2.942  -0.748  -1.967*  -5.320*** 
Only  (0.309) (0.558) (0.316) (0.223) (0.014) 
      
CA vs. U.S.  -3.062***  -4.687*** 0.347  -1.682*  -7.656*** 
  (0.365) (0.574) (0.597) (0.852) (0.879) 
      
TX vs. U.S.  -1.823***  -2.163***  1.336**  -0.893  -6.169*** 
  (0.382) (0.558) (0.599) (0.908) (0.802) 
      
Blacks -1.274*  -2.607**  0.237  -0.182 -3.218*** 
Only  (0.745) (1.117) (0.641) (1.114) (1.099) 
      
Year 1996  -2.110***  -3.225***  1.011  -1.279  -6.000*** 
Omitted  (0.503) (0.844) (0.851) (0.945) (0.841) 
      
Washington -2.098***  -3.380*** -0.123  -0.177  -5.195*** 
Included  (0.610) (0.994) (0.855) (1.135) (1.510) 
      
Florida -1.341* -2.802***  1.311* -0.292  -4.372** 
Included  (0.797) (0.937) (0.653) (0.718) (1.720) 
      
Mississippi -2.537***  -3.521*** -0.234  -1.162  -5.459*** 
Included  (0.512) (0.846) (1.005) (0.917) (1.365) 
      
Louisiana -2.167*** -3.614*** 0.591  -0.705  -5.016*** 
Included  (0.411) (0.810) (0.637) (0.882) (1.387) 
      
Mother’s -2.000***  -2.790***  0.901  -0.876  -5.938*** 
AFQT  (0.466) (0.829) (0.713) (0.943) (0.912) 
      
Net Family  -2.314***  -3.902*** 1.518**  -0.465  -6.994*** 
Income (0.475) (0.900) (0.653) (0.949) (1.177) 
      
Marital -1.977***  -3.285***  0.796  -0.077  -6.069*** 
Status  (0.562) (1.098) (0.648) (0.882) (0.966) 
      
Family Size  -2.335***  -3.459*** 0.469  -0.683  -6.366*** 
  (0.535) (1.025) (0.640) (0.888) (0.891) 
      
Net Income   -2.043***  -3.771***  1.705**  0.086  -6.802*** 
&  Marital  (0.578) (0.919) (0.678) (0.923) (1.228) 
      
Net Income &   -2.313***  -3.913***  1.479**  -0.350  -6.989*** 
Family  Size  (0.476) (0.902) (0.652) (0.963) (1.182) 
      
Marital &  -1.963***  -3.193***  0.869  -0.108  -6.087*** 
Family  Size  (0.564) (1.131) (0.649) (0.876) (0.959) 
      
All -2.024***  -3.676***  1.731**  0.087  -6.792*** 
  (0.507) (0.953) (0.687) (0.926) (1.228) 
Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Regression covariates also included mother’s high grade, gender, birth order, urban, grade, age, number of times child 




  35Table 8: PIAT Math - Policy Impact by Race/Ethnicity, Age, and Mother’s Education 
  All  7 & 8  9 & 10  11 & 12  13 & 14 
Policy*CalTex* Black          
Mother’s -1.210  -2.355  0.379  0.069  -3.391** 
Education <13  (0.785)  (2.727) (0.994)  (1.234)  (1.287) 
         
Mother’s -4.043***  -4.485***  -1.277  -1.506  -7.821*** 
Education 13+  (1.036)  (1.243)  (1.350)  (1.997)  (1.882) 
Policy*CalTex* Hispanic          
Mother’s -0.639  0.267  -0.383  1.384  -2.736 
Education <13  (1.231)  (1.861) (1.189)  (1.740)  (2.257) 
         
Mother’s -0.727  1.978  -3.989  0.498  4.259* 
Education 13+  (1.035)  (1.917)  (2.579)  (1.857)  (2.265) 
Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses.       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Regression covariates also included mother’s high grade, gender, birth order, urban, grade, age, number of times child 


































  36Table 9: PIAT Math – Rate of Growth in Test Scores - Individual Fixed Effects Model 
 U.S.   
(1990 – 1994) 
U.S.  
(1996 – 2000) 
CalTex Only 
(1996 – 2000) 
Blacks Only 
(1996 – 2000) 
Policy*Black  -1.607 -0.426 -7.190***   
  (0.979) (1.129) (2.409)  
      
Policy*Hispanic -0.924  2.736*  -3.386   
  (1.907) (1.431) (2.211)  
      
Policy*CalTex  0.875 1.530   -5.606*** 
  (2.301) (1.382)   (1.812) 
      
Policy*CalTex*Black -0.808  -7.092***     
  (2.758) (2.618)    
      
Policy*CalTex*Hispanic -3.183 -5.936***     
  (3.112) (2.174)    
      
Times  Taken  0.566 0.475 -3.079  2.098 
  (2.018) (1.914) (3.058) (3.335) 
      
Mother’s  High  Grade  0.272 0.456 0.283 0.804 
  (0.334) (0.679) (0.539) (2.084) 
      
Year2000 12.412***  13.200**  18.829**  6.351 
  (4.237) (4.934) (8.298) (8.299) 
      
Grade  5.267*** 4.507*** 4.522*** 6.306*** 
  (0.921) (0.793) (1.235) (1.521) 
      
Grade
2  -0.467*** -0.404*** -0.347*** -0.513*** 
  (0.070) (0.050) (0.070) (0.089) 
      
Constant 19.914***  22.855*  34.270***  6.607 
 (6.361)  (11.701)  (11.485)  (31.962) 
Observations  1770 1304 290  360 
Number of Children  885  652  145  180 
R-squared  0.79 0.79 0.79 0.78 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
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kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 1.9937
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